Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency

Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency

Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency

Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency

Serious Marine Accident – Grounding of the Passenger Ship Frane Express Brač Island, October 12, 2024

Serious Marine Accident – Grounding of the Passenger Ship Frane Express Brač Island, October 12, 2024

Serious Marine Accident – Grounding of the Passenger Ship Frane Express Brač Island, October 12, 2024

Summary:

On 12 October 2024, around 05:11, the passenger ship “Frane Express”, departing from the port of Bol on Brač island towards the port of Split Kaštela, ran aground in the south-western part of the Brač island with 28 passengers on board. Three of them were seriously injured and required hospitalization. The other passengers were found to have sustained minor injuries following medical examination.

The causal factor of this accident is the misinterpretation of the navigational situation and the deviation of the ship’s actual position from the position perceived by the navigator, arising from the fact that navigation was conducted solely by visual lookout at night without the support of technical aids. For radar device, which was not installed on board the ship, there was no obligation for fitting with, according to the applicable regulations, with regard to the navigation area, tonnage and length of the particular ship. Therefore, one safety recommendation is issued to the regulator to amend the rules regarding the radar-equipment requirements for passenger vessels on domestic voyages that are not yet covered by the existing provisions. Furthermore, the navigation plotter, although on board and turned on, was not in use. In that sense, one safety lesson is issued on the importance of conducting navigation supported by technical navigation aids, particular in night conditions, as well as in conditions of reduced visibility.

A contributory factor of this accident is the inadequately prepared and adjusted brightness of the indicators on the control station panel, i.e. the absence of a dedicated light indicator cover. As a result, the sudden and undesired effect of glare from the control panel indicators, further reflected off the ship’s windows and the smooth cabin surfaces, temporarily blinded the navigator whose eyes were adapted to the dark conditions, immediately after uncovering the previously fully covered control panel, just moments before the vessel struck the rocky shore. An additional contributory factor is the decisions and actions resulting from a compromise, where the prevailing focus on pre-assumed obligations to transport passengers and certain commercial considerations took precedence over navigation safety rules.

Based on the results of the safety investigation of this accident, and derived from the analysis and conclusions of this report, the Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency issue the following safety lesson:

✓ AIN05-SL-1/2026

Use of technical aids and brightness adjustment

At night or in reduced visibility, the vessel’s position relative to nearby shorelines and surrounding objects cannot be reliably determined solely by visual observation. In such conditions, navigation must be conducted using technical aids.

Brightness of technical aids to navigation and other light indicators on the bridge must be adjustable in intensity, visible in the dark, and capable of being fully dimmed. Equipment display and indicators should have minimal impact on night vision, and their brightness adapted to working conditions and crew needs. Light sources must be adjusted to prevent glare, reflections or “mirror” effects on windows and surfaces above control panels, ensuring that the crew can maintain undistracted and effective visual lookout.

Recipients: This safety lesson is for all navigators at sea.

 

Safety recommendations are intended for those recipients who are most competent for their implementation, with the aim of preventing future accidents and incidents and improving safety in general. Safety recommendations in no case create a presumption of liability or blame for the accident. Based on the results of the safety investigation of this accident, and derived from the analysis and conclusions of this report, the Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency issue the following safety recommendation:

✓ AIN05-SR-1/2026

It is recommended that Ministry of the Sea, Transport and Infrastructure, Maritime Safety Directorate, amends the Rules for Statutory Certification of Seagoing Ships, Navigational Aids (Official Gazette 97/2015) in order to appropriately regulate the requirement for equipping with radar devices those passenger ships engaged in domestic voyages that are currently not covered by these Rules.”

Investigation details:

Investigation ID 342-27/24-01/09
Start of investigation 23.10.2024
End of investigation 19.01.2026
Type
Status

Documents:

i

Safety recommendations:

The Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency, based on the conducted investigation of this accident, in order to increase the safety of the railway system, issues the following safety recommendations:

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