Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency

Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency

Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency

Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency

Very Serious Marine Accident – Grounding of the Vessel Deala, Eastern Coast of Istria, April 16, 2024

Very Serious Marine Accident – Grounding of the Vessel Deala, Eastern Coast of Istria, April 16, 2024

Very Serious Marine Accident – Grounding of the Vessel Deala, Eastern Coast of Istria, April 16, 2024

Summary:

On April 12, 2024, the Tanzanian flag livestock carrier Deala, built in 1976, lowered 5 shackles of starboard anchor chain near the entrance to Raša Bay along the southeastern coast of the Istrian Peninsula, awaiting for the planned loading of cargo at the Croatian port of Bršica.Dana 12. travnja 2024. godine tanzanijski brod za prijevoz stoke „Deala“, izgrađen 1976. godine, spušta pet noda desnog sidrenog lanca nedaleko od ulaza u zaljev Raša uz jugoistočnu obalu istarskog poluotoka, čekajući planirani ukrcaj tereta u hrvatskoj luci Bršica.

Four days later, deteriorating weather was forecast for the afternoon. The vessel traffic control service (VTS) informed the crew about the forecast and advised them to move away from the anchorage. The crew accepted the received instructions; however, as time passed, they repeatedly delayed leaving the anchorage, while still announcing their intent to follow the instructions. The wind gradually increased, putting additional strain on the anchoring system and its components, which ultimately led to a sudden break in the starboard anchor chain, resulting in the ship began to drift towards nearby shallows.
The master ordered the main engine to be prepared for manoeuvring, and half an hour after the anchor chain snapped, unsuccessfully attempted to move the ship out of her precarious situation.

At 6:59 pm, the ship grounded on its port side on a shallow near Cape Kremen. The sea flooded the engine room, causing the complete shutdown of all generators, which led the master to decide to abandon the ship together with his crew. All crew members were transferred by tugboats, uninjured, and safely taken to shore.

The grounded hull of the ship was heavily damaged, and in the days following the accident, fuel was pumped out in controlled manner. The shipowner soon after the accident renounced ownership, so the responsibility for removal was assigned to the Maritime Safety Administration of the relevant ministry and the ship’s insurance company. At the time of concluding this investigation, the ship had not yet been removed from the casualty site, and the removal process remains in the planning stage.

The investigation concluded that the accident occurred due to repeated delays in leaving the anchorage, which brought the ship into a situation where the interaction of various contributing factors led to the accident. No risk assessment was made regarding the ship’s stay at anchor. The anchor system and its equipment were in poor condition, as a consequence of irregular maintenance of the deck equipment. Other factors include the inadequate ratio of depth and chain length due to the absence of company instructions, lack of due diligence in watchkeeping and vessel position monitoring, unpreparedness of the port anchor for emergency use, delayed readiness of the main engine combined with the reluctance to use it more decisively, and inaccurate communication with the VTS service from the responsible personnel on the bridge.

Three safety lessons are issued regarding watchkeeping while anchored, communication between the ship and VTS, and maintenance of the ship’s anchoring system. In the context of the ship owner’s renunciation of ownership of the vessel, and the complete absence of communication with the flag state and classification society, issuing any safety recommendations to these parties was deemed unnecessary and ineffective, and therefore, was omitted.

Based on the results of the safety investigation into the marine casualty of the cargo ship “Deala” and following the analysis and conclusions of this report, the Agency for the Investigation of Accidents in Air, Maritime, and Railway Transport issues the following safety lessons:

✓ AIN05-SL-2/2025

Required actions while at anchor

During the planning phase of the ship’s anchorage, the responsible personnel on board must conduct a risk assessment, considering all potential hazards that could endanger the vessel. These include meteorological and hydrological conditions, the distance from shallows and other objects, the poor condition of the anchor and chain system, navigational aids and shore-based markers, other vessels, as well as safety and environmental standards.
The ratio of depth to the length of the deployed anchor chain should comply with company guidelines and the technical specifications of the anchor and anchoring system, in accordance with generally accepted maritime industry standards.
Diligent monitoring and timely preventive measures to mitigate the risk of collision, impact, or grounding are fundamental principles of safe and responsible watchkeeping while at anchor. Continuous visual observation must be supplemented by all available technical means.
A precise calculation and plotting of the swinging circle around the anchor must be carried out at the very beginning of the anchorage, using all available tools. The ship’s position should be regularly determined by all available methods, with particular emphasis on fixing the position using a fixed coastal object or another stationary object at sea. The anchor chain must be regularly inspected as part of routine safety checks, with increased frequency in extraordinary situations.
A second anchor must always be ready for deployment in case the primary anchor fails. Deploying the second anchor can quickly neutralize unwanted vessel drift and prevent an accident.
The main engine and the primary steering system must be ready for use within the shortest possible time. If the risk assessment deems it necessary, they should remain available at all times while at anchor, significantly speeding up the response of responsible personnel in the event of a sudden need. Any difficulties with critical ship equipment affecting the vessel’s seaworthiness must be reported to the vessel traffic service.

Recipients: This safety lesson is intended for all participants in maritime industry.


✓ AIN05-SL-3/2025

Communication between ship and VTS

The role of the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is to contribute to the safety of navigation within the VTS maritime area by preventing the development of hazardous situations for the vessel, crew, and environment. This is achieved by providing timely and relevant traffic, navigational, and other information, which can assist crews in their decision-making processes. The VTS is staffed and adequately equipped to interact with maritime traffic by providing specific services and the capability to respond quickly in dangerous circumstances. Therefore, open and timely communication with the competent VTS is of utmost importance for navigational safety, including while the vessel is at anchor.
The rules on providing VTS services, the obligations of vessels, and the manner of ship-VTS interaction are detailed in navigation safety regulations and are made available to end users (vessels) as part of the system for the publication, distribution, and updating of official maritime navigation charts and publications.

Recipients: This safety lesson is intended for all participants in maritime industry that are obliged to use VTS services.


✓ AIN05-SL-4/2025

Anchoring System Maintenance

The anchor, along with the chain and other associated equipment, including the anchor windlass, should be classified as a critical ship system, since its failure could lead to uncontrolled vessel movement and consequently all possible negative outcomes of such situation. Therefore, regular, and thorough maintenance of all system components is a key prerequisite for its safe operation.
Any doubts regarding the condition of this system’s components must be immediately reported to the deck officer responsible for the maintenance of deck equipment. This officer, in coordination with the master and relevant company personnel, must then develop an operational plan to promptly rectify any deficiencies.
The responsible personnel must be familiar with the technical characteristics of the anchoring system, designed to meet maritime industry safety standards.
External inspections and ship surveys should assess the condition of the anchoring system and act in accordance with professional standards.

Recipients: This safety lesson is intended for seafarers assigned to operate and supervise this part of the deck equipment, shipowners, ship operators, companies, maritime safety inspection authorities, and classification societies.

Investigation details:

Investigation ID 342-27/24-01/02
Start of investigation 22.04.2024.
End of investigation 02.07.2025.
Type
Status

Documents:

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Safety recommendations:

The Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accidents Investigation Agency, based on the conducted investigation of this accident, in order to increase the safety of the system, issues the following safety recommendations and/or safety lessons:

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